A recent line of work on lattice codes for Gaussian wiretap channels introduced a new lattice invariant called secrecy gain as a code design criterion which captures the confusion that lattice coding produces at an eavesdropper. Following up the study of unimodular lattice wiretap codes (Lin and Oggier in IEEE Trans Inf Theory 59 (6):3295-3303, 2013), this paper investigates 2-and 3-modular lattices which can be constructed from linear codes and compares them with unimodular lattices. Most even 2-and 3-modular lattices are found to have better performance (that is, a higher secrecy gain) than the best unimodular lattices in dimension n, 2 ≤ n ≤ 23. Odd 2-modular lattices are considered, too, and three lattices are found to outperform the best unimodular lattices.
Introduction
In his seminal work, Wyner introduced the wiretap channel [2] , a discrete memoryless channel where the sender Alice transmits confidential messages to a legitimate receiver Bob, in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve, who has only partial access to what Bob sees. Both reliable and confidential communication between Alice and Bob is shown to be achievable at the same time, by exploiting the physical difference between the channel to Bob and that to Eve, without the use of cryptographic means. Since then, many results of information theoretical nature have been found for various classes of wiretap channels ranging from Gaussian point-to-point channels to relay networks (see e.g. [3] for a survey) capturing the trade-off between reliability and secrecy and aiming at determining the highest information rate that can be achieved with weak and also strong secrecy, the so-called secrecy capacity. Coding results focusing on constructing concrete codes that can be implemented in a specific channel are much fewer (see [4, 5] for wiretap codes dealing with channels with erasures, [6] for polar wiretap codes and [7] for wiretap Rayleigh fading channels. A different view point is the constructions of wiretap codes characterized by the application of randomness extractors to obtain secure and not only reliable but also efficient codes [8, 9] . In particular, it was shown in [9] that for many discrete channels, achieving mutual information security, which is in effect strong secrecy for any message distribution, is equivalent to achieving semantic security, which is the standard security accepted in the cryptography community. Their constructions achieve semantic security, namely, mutual information security. It turned out that the polar code construction in [6] also achieves semantic security although reliability over the main channel is not proven when it is noisy.
In this paper, we will focus on Gaussian wiretap channels, whose secrecy capacity was established in [10] . Examples of existing Gaussian wiretap codes were designed for binary inputs, as in [11, 12] . A different approach was adopted in [13] , where lattice codes were proposed, using as design criterion a new lattice invariant called secrecy gain, defined as the maximum of its secrecy function (Sect. 2), which was shown to characterize the confusion at the eavesdropper. A recent study [14] generalized the result concerning semantic security of [9] to continuous channels. They also proposed another new lattice design criterion called the flatness factor. They showed that a vanishing flatness factor (or equivalently an infinitely large secrecy gain) implies semantic security. This suggests the study of the secrecy gain of lattices as a way to understand how to design a good Gaussian lattice wiretap code. Belfiore and Solé [15] discovered a symmetry point, called weak secrecy gain, in the secrecy function of unimodular lattices (generalized to all -modular lattices [16] ) and conjectured that the weak secrecy gain is actually the secrecy gain. Anne-Maria Ernvall-Hytönen [17, 18] invented a method to prove or disprove the conjecture for unimodular lattices. Up to date, secrecy gains of a special class of unimodular lattices called extremal unimodular lattices and all unimodular lattices in dimensions up to 23 are computed [1, 16] . The asymptotic behavior of the average weak secrecy gain as a function of the dimension n was investigated and an achievable lower bound on the secrecy gain of even unimodular lattices was given [16] . Numerical upper bounds on the secrecy gains of unimodular lattices in general and unimodular lattices constructed from self-dual binary codes were given to compared with the achievable lower bound [19] . Recent developments on the secrecy gain conjecture include: [20] illustrated a set of infinitely many unimodular lattices satisfy the conjecture, [21] shortened the proof in [17] and verified the conjecture for more unimodular lattices, [22] discovered a 4-modular lattice that fails to satisfy the conjecture.
This paper studies the weak secrecy gain of 2-and 3-modular lattices. Preliminary work [23] showed that most of the known even 2-and 3-modular lattices in dimensions up to 24 have secrecy gains bigger than the best unimodular lattices. After recalling how to compute the weak secrecy gain of even 2-and 3-modular lattices using the theory of modular forms, we extend our study to a class of odd 2-modular lattices constructed from self-dual codes. We focus on lattices coming from codes, since they come with an encoding algorithm making them suitable for wiretap coding. We propose two methods to compute their weak secrecy gains and find three of these lattices have secrecy gains bigger than the best unimodular lattices. We then conclude that, at least in dimensions up to 23, 2-and 3-modular lattices are a better option than unimodular lattices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we first give a brief introduction to modular lattices and their theta series as well as recall the definition of the secrecy gain and the previous results concerning this lattice invariant. The main results are given in Sect. 3. Two approaches to compute the theta series of modular lattices are given, one making use of the modular form theory while the other utilizing the connection between the theta series and the weight enumerator of self-dual codes. Both approaches are explored, so as to best explore the techniques known so far to compute the secrecy gain of a lattice. Weak secrecy gains of several 2-and 3-modular lattices computed are then compared with the best unimodular lattices in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5, we summarize our results and give some future works.
Preliminaries and previous results
Consider a Gaussian wiretap channel, which is modeled as follows: Alice wants to send data to Bob over a Gaussian channel whose noise variance is given by σ 2 b . Eve is the eavesdropper trying to intercept data through another Gaussian channel with noise variance σ 2 e , where σ 2 b < σ 2 e , in order to have a positive secrecy capacity [10] . More precisely, the model is
x ∈ R n is the transmitted signal. y and z are the received signals at Bob's, respectively Eve's side. v b and v e denote the Gaussian noise vectors at Bob's, respectively Eve's side, each component of both vectors are with zero mean, and respective variance σ 2 b and σ 2 e . In this paper, we choose x to be a codeword coming from a specially designed lattice of dimension n, namely, we consider lattice coding. Let us thus start by recalling some concepts concerning lattices, in particular, modular lattices.
A lattice Λ is an additive subgroup of R n , which can be described in terms of its generator matrix M by
. . , m}, a set of linearly independent lattice vectors (also called lattice points). The matrix
where M T denotes the transpose of M, is called the Gram matrix of the lattice. It is easy to see that the (i, j)th entry of G is the inner product of the ith and jth row vectors of M, denoted by
The determinant det(Λ) of a lattice Λ is the determinant of the matrix G, which is independent of the choice of the matrix M. A fundamental region of a lattice is a measurable set R(Λ) ⊂ R n satisfying λ∈Λ (R(Λ) + λ) = R n and (R(Λ) + λ) (R(Λ) + λ ) has measure 0 for any λ = λ . There are many different ways of choosing a fundamental region of a lattice Λ, but the volume of the fundamental region is uniquely determined and called the volume vol(Λ) of Λ, which is exactly √ det(Λ). Let us see an example of a fundamental region of a lattice. The Voronoi cell V Λ (λ) of a lattice point λ in Λ is defined by V Λ (λ) = {x ∈ R n : ||x − λ|| ≤ ||x − λ || for all λ ∈ Λ}, where || · || denotes the Euclidean norm.
The dual of a lattice Λ of dimension n is defined to be
The norm of every lattice point in an integral lattice Λ is always an integer. If the norm is even for every lattice point, then Λ is called an even lattice. Otherwise, it is called an odd lattice. A lattice is said to be equivalent, or geometrically similar to its dual, if it differs from its dual only by possibly a rotation, reflection and change of scale. An integral lattice that is equivalent to its dual is called a modular lattice. Alternatively as it was first defined by Quebbemann [24] , an n-dimensional integral lattice Λ is modular if there exists a similarity σ of R n such that σ (Λ * ) = Λ. If σ multiplies norms by , Λ is said to be -modular. The determinant of an -modular lattice Λ of dimension n is given by
This is because, on the one hand, det(Λ * ) = det(Λ) −1 by definition and, on the other hand, n det(Λ * ) = det(Λ) since σ (Λ * ) = Λ. When = 1, det(Λ) = 1 and we recover the definition of unimodular lattice as an integral lattice whose determinant is 1.
is an -modular lattice [25] . When is a prime number,
We will use some terminology from classical error correction codes in this paper. Unfamiliar readers can refer to [26] . We will also assume basic knowledge of algebraic number theory [27] . There is a classical way of constructing -modular lattices from self-dual codes called Construction A. Let K = Q( √ μ) be a quadratic imaginary extension of the rational field Q constructed by adjoining to it the square root of a square free negative integer μ. The ring of integers O K of K is given by
Let p be a prime number. Then the quotient ring R = O K / pO K is given by
Let k be a positive integer. Let
be the map of component wise reduction modulo pO K . Then the pre-image ρ −1 (C) of a self-dual code C over R of length k with carefully chosen μ and p and possibly a re-scaling can give rise to a real -modular lattice of dimension 2k [28, 29] . Examples will be specified in the sequel.
Definition 1
The theta series of a lattice Λ is defined by
where ||λ|| 2 = λ · λ is called the norm of λ and H = {a + ib ∈ C|b > 0} denotes the upper half plane.
The theta series of an integral lattice has a neat representation. Since the norms are all integers, we can combine the terms with the same norm and write
where A m counts the number of lattice points with norm m. They are actually modular forms [30] . We will also need the following functions and formulae from analytic number theory for our discussion.
Definition 2
The Jacobi theta functions are defined [31, Section 4.1] as follows:
The Jacobi theta functions and the Dedekind eta function are connected as follows :
Lattice encoding for the wiretap channel (1) is done via a generic coset coding strategy [13] : let Λ e ⊂ Λ b be two nested lattices. A k-bit message is mapped to a coset in Λ b /Λ e , after which a vector is randomly chosen from the coset as the encoded word. The lattice Λ e can be interpreted as introducing confusion for Eve, while Λ b is intended to ensure reliability for Bob. Lattices constructed from codes are thus preferred for the constructions of wiretap codes, since they naturally come with a coset encoder, as explained in [16] . Since a message is now corresponding to a coset of codewords instead of one single codeword, the probability of correct decoding is then summing over the whole coset (suppose that we do not have power constraint and are utilizing the whole lattice to do the encoding). Here we are interested in computing P c,e , Eve's probability of correct decision, and want to minimize this probability. It was shown in [13, 16] that to minimize P c,e is to minimize
which is easily recognized as the theta series of Λ e at τ = i
. We hence only care about values of τ such that τ = yi, y > 0. Motivated by the above argument, the theta series of Λ e captures the confusion brought by the lattice Λ e . It thus compared to a strategy where no coding is involved, namely, QAM symbols are transmitted (corresponding to the lattice Z n ), which is scaled to ensure that two lattices with the same volume are compared. This leads to the following measure of confusion: Definition 4 [13] Let Λ be an n-dimensional lattice of volume v n . The secrecy function of Λ is given by
The secrecy gain is then the maximal value of the secrecy function with respect to τ and is denoted by χ Λ .
-modular lattices were shown to have a symmetry point at τ = i √ in their secrecy function, which was called weak secrecy gain χ w Λ [16] . The reason for this name is that all unimodular, 2-and 3-modular lattices studied so far have a maximum at this point. However, this point has been shown to be an actual maximum only for some classes of unimodular lattices, as reported in the introduction, therefore, in general, we cannot claim that this point is indeed the strong secrecy gain. See Fig. 1 for an example of typical behaviour, where y is plotted in dB to transform the multiplicative symmetry point into an additive symmetry point. BW 16 is a 2-modular lattice. One can see there is a symmetry point at y = − 3 2 dB, which is √ 2 2 . In this paper, we compute the weak secrecy gain of 2-and 3-modular lattices in small dimensions, and use numerical computations to check that we indeed get a maximum. We rely on numerical computations since analytical methods are not yet known to handle this case. They do not give as definite a claim since they do not handle points at infinity, they are however satisfactorily enough for the purpose of designing wiretap codes, since the secrecy gain is a function of SNR (signal-to-noise-ratio). 
The weak secrecy gain of 2-and 3-modular lattices in small dimensions
The key to the computation of secrecy gains is the theta series of the corresponding lattice. We present here two approaches to obtain a closed form expression of the theta series of 2-and 3-modular lattices: the modular form approach and the weight enumerator approach. The modular form approach relies on the fact that the theta series of an -modular lattice belongs to the space of modular forms generated by some basic functions, which gives a decomposition formula. The formula for even 2-and 3-modular lattices is simpler than the general formula for -modular (possibly odd) lattices, which holds for the specific values of = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 23 [25] . A weight enumerator approach is added in the computation for odd 2-modular lattices in the second subsection. This approach exploits the connection between the weight enumerator of a self-dual code and the theta series of a lattice constructed from this code. But calculating the weight enumerator of the code adds considerable workload.
Even 2 and 3-modular lattices
The theta series of modular lattices are modular forms, which, roughly speaking, are functions that stay "invariant" under the transformation by certain subgroups of the group SL 2 (Z) [30] . The modular form theory shows that theta series as modular forms are expressed in a polynomial in two basic modular forms. We only need a few terms of a theta series to compute the coefficients of this expression and obtain a closed form expression of the theta series. The following lemma plays a crucial role in our calculation of the theta series of 2-and 3-modular lattices.
Lemma 1 [24] The theta series of an even -modular lattice of dimension n = 2k when = 1, 2, 3 belongs to a space of modular forms of weight k generated by the functions Θ λ 2k 0 (τ )Δ μ 2k 1 (τ ) with integers λ, μ ≥ 0 satisfying k 0 λ + k 1 μ = k, where for = 1, 2, 3, k 0 = 4, 2, 1 respectively, k 1 = 24 1+ , Θ 2k 0 (τ ) denote the theta series of the modular lattices E 8 , D 4 and A 2 , respectively, and Δ 2k 1 (τ ) = (η(τ )η( τ )) k 1 .
Example 2 If = 1, we read from Lemma 1 that k 0 = 4, k 1 = 24 2 = 12, Θ 2k 0 (τ ) = Θ E 8 (τ ) and Δ 2k 1 (τ ) = η 24 (τ ). We then deduce that if Λ is an even unimodular lattice of dimension n = 2k then
The formula (9) was adopted in [15, 16] to compute the secrecy gains of several even unimodular lattices.
In order to write the secrecy function, we need to have the theta series of Z n scaled to the right volume. Now it follows from (2) that
According to Lemma 1, the theta series of an even 2-modular lattice Λ of dimension n = 2k can be written as
where
and
By (7), we can write Δ 16 (τ ) in terms of Jacobi theta functions and compute the first few terms:
The secrecy function of an even 2-modular lattice Λ of dimension n is then written as
, or more conveniently,
Now we only need to know the coefficients a μ in order to compute the weak secrecy gain of a 2-modular lattice. Let us compute an example to show how the coefficients a μ 's in (11) are computed. By substituting (12) and (13) into (11), we have a formal sum with coefficients represented by the a μ 's. Then by comparing this formal sum with (6) , we obtain a number of linear equations in the a μ 's. When we have enough equations, the a μ 's can be recovered by solving a linear system. 16 is an even lattice with minimum norm 4. The theta series of BW 16 looks like
Example 3 BW
On the other hand, by (11) , (12) and (13),
We now have two linear equations in two unknowns a 0 and a 1 a 0 = 1 96a 0 + a 1 = 0 which gives a 0 = 1 and a 1 = −96, yielding the theta series
The weak secrecy gain of BW 16 can then be approximated using Mathematica [33] (see Fig. 1 ):
Similarly according to Lemma 1, the theta series of an even 3-modular lattice Λ of dimension n = 2k can be written as
and Δ 12 (τ ) = (η(τ )η(3τ )) 6 .
We can also compute the first few terms of Δ 12 (τ ): The secrecy function of an even 3-modular lattice Λ of dimension n is Table 1 summarizes the weak secrecy gains of even 2-and 3-modular lattices computed. The basic information about these lattices, such as minimum norm and kissing number can be found in [34].
Odd 2-modular lattices
Odd 2-modular lattices were constructed in [28, 29] via Construction A. They are, by the time of writing this paper, the only known instances of odd 2-modular lattices with an explicit construction coming from codes, a property useful for the lattices to be used as wiretap codes. There is a natural connection between the theta series of the lattice constructed from a code C via Construction A and an appropriate weight enumerator of the code C. We will exploit this connection to obtain a closed form expression for these lattices.
For the rest of the paper, we will let K = Q( √ −2) and R = O K /3O K , where the notations are explained in Sect. 2. According to (4), since −2 ≡ 2 mod 4, the ring
O K , the ideal 3O K splits. According to (5) , the quotient ring R = O K /3O K = F 3 ×F 3 . Note that the ring F 3 +vF 3 with v 2 = 1 is isomorphic to the ring F 3 × F 3 , through an isomorphism δ : 1) → (a, b) . We will identify R = O K /3O K with the ring F 3 + vF 3 and use the two notations interchangeably. In particular, we will identify the coset a + 3O K with a ∈ F 3 , and the coset √ −2 + 3O K with v. Let C be a code of length n = 2k over R = F 3 + vF 3 = O K /3O K , which is by definition a R-submodule of R n . According to Construction A, ρ −1 (C) is a lattice over O K 1 , say, with generator matrix
ρ −1 (C) real denote the real lattice defined by the generator matrix
Now we look at the theta series of the lattice 1 √ 3 ρ −1 (C) real constructed from a code C over R.
Definition 5 [29] The length function l K of an element r in R = F 3 + vF 3 
wherex is the complex conjugation of x.
One computes the length of the nine elements of R as follows:
Definition 6 [29] The length composition n l (x), l = 0, 1, 2, 3 of a vector x in R n counts the number of coordinates of length l. The length weight enumerator of a code C over R is then defined by lwe C (a, b, c, d) = c∈C a n 0 (c) b n 1 (c) c n 2 (c) d n 3 (c) .
Define four theta series θ l , l = 0, 1, 2, 3 corresponding to the four different lengths of elements of R:
Recalling that O K = {a + b √ −2|a, b ∈ Z}, the theta series are written as double sums.
We already know how to handle the lm 2 type of infinite sum, namely,
For the (3m + 1) 2 type of infinite sum, we first observe that, on one hand,
and, on the other hand,
We then conclude that
The four theta series defined above are then computed as
Theorem 1
Proof The theta series of the lattice 1
As it was remarked in [28] (Remark 3.8) and later proved in [29] , if C is a self-dual code over R with respect to Hermitian inner product, then 1
Example 4 A Hermitian self-dual code C over R of length 4 was constructed in [29] . It is a linear code with a generator matrix
One can generate all the 81 codewords and compute the length weight enumerator:
The theta series of the 8-dimensional odd 2-modular lattice is then computed by (25) (using a computer software, for example, Mathematica [33] to output the first few terms).
This method has the advantage of being self-contained in its deduction. But the computation of the weight enumerator of the code C is tedious and, worse still, as the dimension increases, it may become infeasible. Let us fall back to the first approach adopted in the previous subsection.
First we need a formula similar to Lemma 1 which deals with the theta series of odd 2-modular lattices. There is indeed a formula which deals with the theta series of -modular lattice, including the odd lattices, for = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 14, 15, 23 discovered by E. M. Rains and N. J. A. Sloane.
Lemma 2 [25] Define
where the lattice C is as defined in (3 
The theta series of an -modular lattice Λ of dimension kdim(C ( ) ) can be written as
where ord 1 ( f 1 ) is the divisor of the modular form f 1 (τ ), which, in this case, is 1 Let us now take = 2. Then C 2 = Z ⊕ √ 2Z hence
Next, ord 1 ( f 1 ) is computed to be 1 2 . D 2 = 16. Finally since 2 is even
.
We observe that the denominator of f 2 (τ ) is 4 f 2 1 (τ ). We then define a function
and rewrite (27) in the form of (11):
For lattices in small dimensions, the first few terms of the theta series can be computed numerically using computer softwares, for example, Magma [35] .
Example 5 A generator matrix of the 8-dimensional odd 2-modular lattice in Example 4 can be computed from the generator matrix (26) of the code C:
To make the typing easy, we compute the Gram matrix 
Best known lattices
Now that we have computed the weak secrecy gains of several 2-and 3-modular lattices, we want to compare them with the best unimodular lattices in their respective dimensions. Figure 2 compares the secrecy gains of the best unimodular lattices with the weak secrecy gains of the 2-and 3-modular lattices we have computed. We can see that most of these even 2-and 3-modular lattices, indicated by disconnected big dots, outperform the unimodular lattices except in dimension 22, and three of the odd 2-modular lattices, indicated by disconnected small dots, outperform the unimodular lattices, in particular, in dimension 18, the odd 2-modular lattice has the best secrecy gain known by now. Table 3 gives a list of 2-and 3-modular lattices out-performing the best unimodular lattices.
Conclusion and future work
This paper computes the weak secrecy gains of several known 2-and 3-modular lattices in small dimensions. Most of the even 2-and 3-modular lattices and three of the odd 2-modular lattices have a higher secrecy gain than the best unimodular lattices. We then conclude that, at least in dimensions up to 23, 2-and 3-modular lattices are better option for Gaussian wiretap channel.
A line of future work would naturally be investigating -modular lattices for other values of to understand if bigger allows better modular lattices in terms of secrecy gain. Also, more 2-and 3-modular lattice examples should be found to get a better understanding of why they have a higher secrecy gain, since a classification of such lattices is currently unavailable even in small dimensions.
